

MAR 1952

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INFORMATION FROM
 FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

25X1A
 REPORT NO.

CD NO. --

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFORMATION 1952

SUBJECT Economic; Technological - Machine tools, spare parts, sewing machines
 HOW PUBLISHED Monthly periodical; daily newspaper

DATE DIST. 25 Mar 1953

WHERE PUBLISHED Moscow

NO. OF PAGES 5

DATE PUBLISHED Oct - 10 Dec 1952

LANGUAGE Russian

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

ILLEGIB

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Periodical and newspaper as indicated.

SHORTCOMINGS IN HIGH-LEVEL USSR PRODUCTION PLANNING

STRESS NEED FOR ORGANIZATION OF SPARE-PARTS SUPPLY -- Moscow, Za Ekonomiyu Materialov, Oct 52

Assignments for the rapid growth of production in all branches of socialist industry are imparting great significance to problems concerning more productive utilization of equipment and assurance of its uninterrupted operation. In this regard, the on-schedule delivery of spare parts to industrial enterprises is of special importance.

The most progressive system in this respect is the centralized manufacture of spare parts for machines at the plants where these machines are being manufactured at present or had been manufactured previously. This is the procedure followed by the Ministry of Automobile and Tractor Industry and by certain branches of the Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building.

Unfortunately, this is not the case at a number of other ministries, in particular, the Ministry of Machine Tool Building. For example, Model DIP-200 screw-cutting lathes have very wide distribution among machine building enterprises, as well as at auxiliary shops of other branches of industry. However, the manufacturer of these lathes, the Moscow Krasnyy Proletariy Plant, does not engage in the production of spare parts for them.

There are other machine tool building plants which do not supply spare parts for machine tools of their own manufacture. This compels many consumer enterprises to manufacture their own spare parts for machine tools and other types of equipment, in a clumsy manner, in their own repair workshops.

Even at machine building plants where machinery and repair shops can be adapted for basic functions such as casting, forging, and heat treatment, as well as for a plant laboratory, the cost of spare parts amounts to a great deal more than if they had been manufactured at a specializing plant. The cost of producing spare parts at other than machine building plants, where the repair and machinery facilities are limited, amounts to three times as much.

25X1A

25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL

It is needless to add that such practice is an expensive proposition as far as the state is concerned, since it not only leads to the overexpenditure of metal and capital, but also brings with it a deterioration in the effective utilization of existing equipment. Machine building plants and ministries must organize centralized manufacture of spare parts for equipment which is being produced or has been produced by them.

However, in those cases where individual branches of industry do supply the national economy with spare parts, a number of shortcomings can be observed. Too frequently, sets of spare parts are incomplete, and often the parts supplied are of low quality.

For example, consumers complain regularly about the poor quality of spare parts for sewing machines produced by the Podolsk Machinery Plant of the Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building. A check of the sizes of several batches of shuttle parts has revealed that 50 percent of these parts for the Class 22A sewing machine have been manufactured with a deviation from the sizes specified by the plant blueprint.

The situation is even worse in the case of sewing machine spare parts manufactured by the Kuybyshev Machinery Plant of the Glavmashdetal' (Main Administration of Machine Parts Building), Ministry of Light Industry USSR. For example, a size check of several batches of shuttles for the PMZ Class 4 sewing machine showed that up to 60-70 percent of the parts had been manufactured with considerable deviation from specified sizes.

Many complaints have also been voiced by workers of the polygraphic industry concerning the quality of machines and separate units.

Concurrently with the organization of centralized production of basic spare parts, the quality of parts must also be improved considerably. The publication by supply plants of catalogs containing working drafts of the spare parts in greatest demand would help a great deal in the solution of this problem.

The publication of catalogs containing working drafts of rapidly wearing parts for basic technological equipment for all branches of industry should be initiated.

The organization of the supply of spare parts to all branches of industry is a problem of great importance to the national economy. This matter must be brought into proper order. -- I. Makhlovich, engineer

LACK OF PRODUCTION PLANNING AND BYPASSING CHANNELS CREATES NUMEROUS EFFICIENCIES -- Moscow, Moskovskaya Pravda, 10 Dec 59

Certain machine tool building plants in Moscow and Moskovskaya Oblast have consistently failed to fulfill plans for labor productivity, output of products in the specified range of types, and reduction of cost of production.

In 10 months of 1959, labor productivity at plants of Glavstankoprom (Main Administration of Machine Tool Building Industry; Karpov, chief) as a whole was 0.2 percent below plan and the cost of production was 1.8 percent in excess of plan, while individual plants lagged even more. For example, the Moscow Internal Grinding Machine Plant has met the plan for labor productivity by only 93 percent and for grinding machines, by 95 percent.

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL

The reason for such unsatisfactory performance is that the management of Glavstankoprom and the plants' directors have relaxed the drive for improvement of qualitative indexes of operation; and have failed to achieve a rhythm in operation, to fulfill and exceed assignments for decreasing labor and material consumption, to eliminate nonproductive expenditures, and to decrease sharply losses due to rejects.

In 1952, the Moscow Grinding Machine Plant (Glukharev, director), Dmitrov Milling Machine Plant (Pupkov, director), and the Moscow Internal Grinding Machine Plant (Tsukanov, director) have been especially inefficient in operation. They have failed almost regularly to meet the monthly plan for the specified products. At and in 3 quarters of 1952 have defaulted in the delivery of products by 13-20 percent.

In 1952, nearly all plants of Glavstankoprom have worked without rhythm. For example, the Moscow Grinding Machine Plant produced 90 percent of its monthly output in the last third of both September and October and the Dmitrov Milling Machine Plant, 83 percent. It is no wonder that casting rejects at the Grinding Machine and Internal Grinding Machine plants have nearly doubled.

A look at the Grinding Machine Plant will uncover the basic cause of last-minute speed-up and explain why it exists.

Glukharev, director, has virtually discharged the chief engineer and other leading personnel at the plant from managerial matters by endeavoring to solve all production problems himself. He does not trust his closest assistants, meddles in the current work of dispatchers and foremen, and substitutes for them. It is not surprising, therefore, that by concerning himself with numerous details he overlooks big, basic tasks in the organization of production. He fails to note, for example, an important gap such as the lack of coordinated intraplant planning.

Instead of solving important planning problems, beginning on the 12th to the 15th of each month the plant director organizes daily confrontations of shop chiefs, which are called dispatchers' meetings. Target dates for producing parts needed for assembly are set at these meetings (and changed dozens of times.) After these meetings are concluded, the director personally walks from shop to shop, with a watch, "knocking out" these parts.

25X1A

The inefficiencies at the plant's foundry which caused plan disruptions throughout the enterprise were described in Moskovskaya Pravda on 25 June 1952. Order should have been brought to the foundry since that time (more than 5 months); however, even now, equipment is often at a standstill, available means of mechanization are utilized poorly, and certain molding machines are so covered with sand that they are practically inaccessible. There is no drive against rejects; normalization has been established in such a way that it does not induce personnel to fulfill qualitative and quantitative indexes (wages are paid for each operation, not for the suitability of the casting).

Unfortunately, the Grinding Machine Plant is not the only enterprise of Glavstankoprom that is failing in its program. At the Dmitrov Milling Machine Plant, the management (Pupkov, director; Frolov, chief engineer) is floundering in current matters rather than dealing with basic production problems. At this plant, as a rule, only 5-7 percent of the plan is completed in the first third of each month. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 3 quarters of 1952 the plant has been deficient in the delivery of dozens of machine tools, has suffered a loss of 530,000 rubles in rejects, and has exceeded the planned cost of production by 6.5 percent.

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL

The ministry pointed out to Glavstankoprom by special order that one of the main reasons for the unsatisfactory operation of its plants is deficient intra-plant planning. However, even this order did not bring about the desired results.

Despite the fact that the management of Glavstankoprom is aware of the situation at the plants, its personnel sometimes spend weeks collecting all possible information and then develop outlines for directives which Karpov, chief of Glavstankoprom, issues in abundance. The difficulty is that the staff of Glavstankoprom does not perform its basic function, that of supervising the execution of directives and instructions, although frequently it is unable to accomplish this duty because organs of the ministry bypass Glavstankoprom. A few factors from the practice of the Technical Division of Glavstankoprom (Chudov, chief) will be set forth.

One of the design bureaus of the ministry, the SKE-3, had designed a Model 3654 machine tool for grinding deep hole drills. In July, the Technical Division of Glavstankoprom rejected the plan and refused to present it for approval to the Technical Administration of the ministry. Yet the plan did fall into the hands of the ministry, and the Technical Administration approved it in August.

Another bureau had developed a plan for modernizing the Model 4A723 electric-spark machine for piercing holes. The Technical Division of Glavstankoprom decided not to present this plan for approval since the design of the machine tool had not been coordinated with consumers, and the need for such machine tools had not been expressed. By decree of the government, this procedure must be followed. This fact notwithstanding, Sekretev, deputy chief of the Technical Administration of the ministry, approved the plan.

The same situation occurred in the case of Model 1A1OP.

In essence, the Technical Division of Glavstankoprom has been transformed into a sort of "price-computing bureau" for new machine tools. It has accumulated piles of calculations, which it simply stamps, since it does not have time to study or verify them.

The situation is no better at other Glavstankoprom divisions. The formulation of plans and programs for plants is done mechanically, without consideration for the power and load of equipment, without determination of optimum groupings or length of the production cycle. There are no plans in Glavstankoprom for technological preparation of production or for operation of preparatory shops. In addition, Glavstankoprom does not work out schedules for starting production, putting out products, supplying material, etc. In other words, there is no clear, basic planning at Glavstankoprom, without which it is powerless to exert any real influence on the plants under its system. For this reason, plant directors prefer to turn directly to the ministry for help, actually bypassing Karpov and his assistants.

As a matter of fact, why turn to Glavstankoprom if no aid is forthcoming from it? Bryuba, deputy chief of Glavstankoprom, and Kagner, chief of Stankotekhnab (Machine Tool Technical Supply), certainly cannot supply a plant with metal if they have none in reserve. Supply plans are drawn up a long time before production plans are completed at plants. For this reason, many plants of Glavstankoprom frequently complain about the shortage of needed materials, while there is a considerable surplus of material at other plants in the system. For example, on 1 September, Glavstankoprom had an above norm surplus of 1,500 tons of metal.

Deficiencies in the delivery of equipment, materials, various items, etc., lead to an increase of uncompleted production, formation of a large above-norm surplus of finished but undelivered products, and the creation of financial difficulties in the machine tool building plants.

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

CONFIDENTIAL

The work of the Glavstankoprom staff must be reorganized decisively to raise the responsibility of all managers and executives. Glavstankoprom must be turned into a genuine staff for managing the activities of each enterprise, capable of quickly overcoming shortcomings in their work. -- S. Levichev, metallurgist, Glavstankoprom; S. Gurov, correspondent, Moskovskaya Pravda.

POINT OUT SHORTCOMINGS AT ENTERPRISES IN LENINGRADSKIY RAYON -- Moscow, Moskovskaya Pravda, 15 Nov 52

As is known, there are many industrial enterprises in Leningradskiy Rayon in Moscow. Some of them are not operating satisfactorily, according to Kozlov, secretary of the Rayon Party Committee. For example, the Moscow Tool Plant has disrupted state plans for a long time. Vinogradov, its director, does not prize the trust bestowed upon him; he makes poor selections of personnel and does not work well with them.

- E N D -

CONFIDENTIAL

ILLEGIB